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* & *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for theft by receiving stolen property, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999). This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Was the State precluded from reopening its case after resting or from obtaining a
continuance of the preliminary hearing under State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986),
and its progeny or under Utah court rules?
Standard of Review. "Interpretation of case law presents a question of law which is
reviewed for correctness." State v. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, f 7, 89 P.3d 191. The
interpretation of a rule of procedure is likewise a question of law reviewed for correctness.
Ostler v. Bvhler, 1999 UT 99, \ 5, 989 P.2d 1073.

2. Was the evidence of defendant'' s constructive possession of the stolen memorabilia
sufficient for bindover?
Standard of Review. The determination of whether to bind a criminal defendant over
for trial is a question of law reviewed for correctness, without deference to the magistrate.
State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, Tf 8, 20 P.3d 300.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)
(i)(l) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held
under the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The
state has the burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the
conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call
witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine
adverse witnesses.
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed
it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be bound over to
answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on
hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was
acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary
examination.
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate
shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense.
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Utah R. Evid. 1102
(a) Statement of the Rule. Reliable hearsay is admissible at criminal
preliminary examinations.
(b) Definition of Reliable Hearsay. For purposes of criminal preliminary
examinations only, reliable hearsay includes:
(1) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under the Utah Rules of Evidence;
(2) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, regardless of the availability of the declarant at the preliminary
examination;
(3) evidence establishing the foundation for or the authenticity of any
exhibit;
(4) scientific, laboratory, or forensic reports and records;
(5) medical and autopsy reports and records;
(6) a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace
officer;
(7) a statement made by a child victim of physical abuse or a sexual
offense which is promptly reported by the child victim and recorded in
accordance with Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
(8) a statement of a declarant that is written, recorded, or transcribed
verbatim which is:
(A) under oath or affirmation; or
(B) pursuant to a notification to the declarant that a false statement made
therein is punishable.
(9) other hearsay evidence with similar indicia of reliability, regardless of
admissibility at trial under Rules 803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(c) Continuance for Production of Additional Evidence. If hearsay
evidence is proffered or admitted in the preliminary examination, a
continuance of the hearing may be granted for the purpose of furnishing
additional evidence if:
(1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted is
not sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for a bindover; or
(2) The defense establishes that it would be so substantially and unfairly
disadvantaged by the use of the hearsay evidence as to outweigh the interests
of the declarant and the efficient administration of justice.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

Defendant was charged with theft by receiving stolen property, a second degree
felony, and theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1-3. On December 17, 2003, a
magistrate held a preliminary hearing. R. 222. The State called three witnesses and rested.
See R. 222: 1-44.

When defendant moved to dismiss for insufficient evidence, the

prosecutor moved to reopen the case. R. 222: 45-47. The magistrate granted the State's
motion and the State recalled the investigating officer. R. 222: 47-49. After the State
finished questioning the officer, the parties argued the sufficiency of the evidence. R. 222:
49-47. The magistrate concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish possession of
all the recovered goods but the earrings, but that it did not adequately establish their value.
R. 222: 57-59. The magistrate continued the hearing to permit the State to put on specific
evidence of the value of the stolen goods that were recovered. R. 222: 58-61.
On January 7,2003, the magistrate resumed the preliminary hearing. SeeR. 223. The
State recalled the victim, who testified about the specific value of the recovered goods. R.
222: 69-117. After the State rested and the parties argued the evidence, the magistrate bound
defendant over for trial on theft by receiving stolen property, but dismissed theft by
deception. R. 223: 126. Defendant filed a motion to quash the bindover, which the trial
court denied. R. 48-54,175-81 (Addendum A). Defendant pled guilty to theft by receiving
stolen property, amended to a third degree felony, reserving his right to appeal the trial
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court's order denying his motion to quash. R. 217-18, 226. Defendant was sentenced to a
suspended prison term of zero-to-five years and ordered to pay restitution. R. 182
SUMMARY OF FACTS

Preliminary Hearing (December 17, 2002)
The following evidence was introduced at the preliminary hearing on December 17, 2002.
\jjjjjjjn July 23,2002, Robert Hildebrand returned home from work and discovered that
his home had been burglarized. R. 222: 6-7. Taken from the home were hundreds of
baseball cards and twelve autographed baseballs—estimated by Hildebrand to be worth more
than $10,000. R. 222:7-10,20-26,30. Also taken from Hildebrand's home was a new DVD
player, a Minolta camera, a stereo, a set of black pearl earrings, and Olympic pins. R. 222:711, 17-20. Hildebrand immediately reported the burglary to police. R. 222: 11.
The following day, Hildebrand notified local baseball card shops of the theft. R. 222:
11-12, 27, 30. About an hour after speaking with Hildebrand, Elvin Allen, the owner of a
local card shop, was approached by two men offering to sell him "a bunch" of baseball cards
that matched the description of those stolen from Hildebrand. R. 222: 28-29. Allen agreed
to buy a few of the cards, issued a check for the purchase, and because the banks were closed
for the holiday, referred the men to a local check-cashing store. R. 222: 28. After the men
left, Allen notified Hildebrand and stopped payment on the check. R. 222: 13, 28-29.
Hildebrand immediately notified police. R. 222: 13.
After receiving Hildebrand's report, police converged on the check-cashing store
where they found defendant and his friend Joshua Boone attempting to cash a check, payable
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to defendant, from a baseball card shop. See R. 222: 13, 33-35, 37, 39, 42. The two men
were detained by police and questioned by Detective Clinton Johnson. R. 222: 35. After
waiving his Miranda rights, defendant told Detective Johnson that while cleaning out
abandoned storage units at work, he "found some baseball cards and other items" near a
dumpster and decided to sell them because he knew they were worth some money. R. 222:
35,37-39. Boone told Detective Johnson that defendant had asked him for a ride to the card
shop so defendant could sell some baseball cards. R. 222: 43. On inspecting Boone's car,
Detective Johnson saw an autographed baseball on the front passenger seat and a single
baseball card on the passenger side floorboard. R. 222: 36.l When Hildebrand arrived on
the scene, he confirmed that the autographed baseball was the most valuable of those taken
from his home, worth "well over" $500. R. 222: 8, 13-14, 20.
In a search of Boone's car incident to arrest, police seized not only the baseball card
and baseball from the passenger compartment, but additional baseball cards found in the
trunk of the car. R. 222: 36,40-41. Hildebrand verified that all of the baseball memorabilia
belonged to him. R. 222: 36. In a subsequent search of Boone's residence, police found
more of Hildebrand's baseball memorabilia, as well as Hildebrand's DVD player and
Olympic pins. R. 222:41.
After the State rested, counsel for defendant moved to dismiss both charges for
insufficient evidence. R. 222: 45-47. Counsel urged that at best, the evidence was sufficient

1

The car was driven by Boone, but belonged to his girlfriend. R. 222: 39, 43.
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for bindover on the theft by receiving charge at a reduced degree, arguing that the evidence
did not establish the necessary value for a second-degree felony. R. 222: 45-46. The
magistrate denied defendant's motion and granted the State's request to reopen its case to
recall Detective Johnson. R. 222: 47. He provided the following additional information.
Detective Johnson recovered Hildebrand's earring set from a local pawn shop. R.
222: 48-49. The pawn receipt indicated that defendant pawned the earrings. R. 222: 49.
After finishing with Detective Johnson, the parties argued the sufficiency of the
evidence for bindover. R. 222: 50-54. The magistrate concluded that the evidence was
sufficient to bind defendant over on the theft by receiving charge, but was not satisfied with
the evidence regarding the value of the recovered property. R. 222: 54-58. Against the
objections of defense counsel, the magistrate continued the preliminary hearing to January
7, 2003 to permit the State to put on additional evidence of value. R. 222: 56-64.
Preliminary Hearing Continued (January 7, 2003)
At the preliminary hearing on January 7, 2003, Robert Hildebrand testified to the
value of the baseball memorabilia as follows.
The baseball cards found in Boone's car were worth more than $1,200. See R. 223:
72-75, 80, 88. The autographed baseball found on the front passenger seat of Boone's car
was worth $600. R. 223: 88-89. Nine more autographed baseballs, worth $700, were found
in Boone's car. R. 223: 81-86. The baseball cards found in Boone's apartment were worth
approximately $10,000. See R. 223: 92-113.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Defendant contends that under State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), and its
progeny, the prosecution was barred from reopening its case at the preliminary hearing and
from obtaining a continuance to introduce additional evidence. The Brickey rule, however,
applies only to the refiling of charges earlier dismissed at a preliminary hearing for
insufficient evidence. It does not apply to reopenings or continuances. Nor should the
Brickey rule be extended to reopenings and continuances. The risks of prosecutorial
overreaching in refiling are not present in reopenings and continuances. Moreover, the rules
of evidence and criminal procedure do not bar a reopening or continuance. Even assuming
arguendo Brickey does apply, any failure of the prosecution to introduce evidence sufficient
for bindover was at worst an innocent miscalculation of the evidence. As such, the
magistrate properly reopened the prosecution's case and continued the hearing.
II. Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish defendant's
constructive possession of the stolen baseball memorabilia in his friend's car and apartment.
While the evidence might be insufficient to meet the reasonable doubt burden required at
trial, it was more than sufficient to meet the relatively low evidentiary standard required at a
preliminary hearing. Defendant admitted to possessing cards that had been stolen from
Hildebrand, he tried to sell the cards, his friend indicated that defendant asked for a ride so
defendant could sell the cards, and defendant confirmed that he rode with defendant to sell
the cards. In light of this evidence, it is reasonable to infer that defendant took the cards to
his friend's apartment and from there went to the card shop with some of the cards.
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ARGUMENT
In his motion to quash the bindover, defendant argued that the magistrate improperly
reopened the hearing after the State rested. R. 48-54. In denying his motion, the trial court
reversed its ruling at the December 17 preliminary hearing and concluded that the evidence
was sufficient for bindover before the State reopened its case. R. 179-80. The court also
ruled that in any event, any alleged error in granting the motion to reopen was harmless. R.
190&.2.
L

THE MAGISTRATE IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM REOPENING A
PRELIMINARY HEARING FOR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE AFTER
THE STATE HAS RESTED, OR FROM CONTINUING THE
PRELIMINARY HEARING TO TAKE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in reopening the preliminary

hearing after the State had rested and continuing the hearing to permit the State to present
more specific evidence on the value of the stolen property that was recovered. Aplt. Brf. at
15-29, 34-50. Defendant claims that the reopening and continuance violated state due
process under State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), and its progeny. Aplt. Brf at 16-.
He also contends that the reopening and continuance were barred under rule 7 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure and rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Brf. at 4143, 49-50. These arguments fail.
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A.

THE BRICKEY RULE APPLIES ONLY TO THE REFILING OF CHARGES
EARLIER DISMISSED FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT A PRELIMINARY
HEARING

1. Brickey and its Progeny Addressed the Propriety of Refiling
Charges That Were Earlier Dismissed,
In support of his claim that the reopening and continuance violated his state due
process rights, defendant relies on Brickey and a line of Utah cases applying the "Brickey
rule/' These decisions, however, address the refiling of criminal charges earlier dismissed
for insufficient evidence at a preliminary hearing. In this case, the magistrate never
dismissed the charges against defendant. These cases, therefore, do not apply here.
In Brickey, the preliminary hearing magistrate dismissed the charge against defendant
after finding insufficient evidence for bindover. 714 P.2d at 645. Disagreeing with the
decision, and candidly admitting that he was forum-shopping, the prosecutor refiled the
charge. Id. at 646-47. The Brickey Court acknowledged that refiling is not barred under
state law or the double jeopardy provisions of the federal and state constitutions. Id. at 646.
The Court held, however, that "due process considerations prohibit a prosecutor from refiling
criminal charges earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the prosecutor can show
that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies
refiling." 714 P.2d at 647 (emphasis added). In this case, the charges were never dismissed
for insufficient evidence or for any other reason.
Defendant also relies on State v. Redd, 2001 UT 113,37 P.3d 1160, State v. Morgan,
2001 UT 87, 34 P.3d 767, and State v. Fish, 966 P.2d 860 (Utah App. 1998). See Aplt. Brf.
at 16, 19-21, 29, 48-49. Those cases likewise involved the refiling of charges after a
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dismissal following a preliminary hearing. See Redd, 2001 UT 113, at ^f 1-3; Morgan, 2001
UT 87, at f 4; Ffcfc, 966 P.2d at 861. They too, therefore, are inapposite.
Support for defendant's claim in other jurisdictions is likewise absent. The cases
cited by defendant from other jurisdictions are inapplicable for the same reason the Utah
cases are inapplicable—they address only the refiling of charges after those same charges
have been dismissed following a preliminary hearing. See Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169,171
(Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (after charges dismissed following a preliminary examination,
prosecutor refiled same charges); Holmes v. District Court of Summit County, 668 P.2d 11
(Colo. 1983) (after charges dismissed following a preliminary hearing, prosecutor filed
information charging defendants with identical charges); People v. Walls, 324 N.W.2d 136
(Mich. App. 1982) (after second-degree sexual conduct charge dismissed following a
preliminary examination, prosecutor charged defendant with first-degree criminal sexual
conduct); Stockwell v. State, 573 P.2d 116 (Idaho 1977) (after magistrate refused to bind
defendant over for second degree murder, prosecutor dismissed voluntary manslaughter
charge and refiled for second degree murder).
In sum, defendant has cited no decision, and the State is aware of none, holding or
even suggesting that due process is violated by reopening the State's case after the
prosecution has rested or by continuing a preliminary hearing to permit the introduction of
additional evidence.
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2. The Brickey Rule Should Not Be Extended to Reopenings or
Continuances.
Defendant nevertheless claims that the Brickey rule should apply to requests to reopen
the prosecution's case or to continue the preliminary hearing. Aplt. Brf. at 15-16 fn.2,18-20,
41-49. He argues that reopening the State's case and continuing the hearing are "akin to
dismissing and refiling" and implicate "the very same fundamental fairness and due process
concerns" of refiling. Aplt. Brf. at 16 fh.2, 18-20, 41. These arguments are unpersuasive.
"The lodestar of Brickey . . . is fundamental fairness." Morgan, 2001 UT 87, % 15.
Brickey and its progeny have thus held that state due process precludes a prosecutor from
seeking an unfair advantage over a defendant through abusive refiling practices. Redd, 2001
UT 113, at % 13. Abusive practices that violate due process include: (1) forum shopping,
Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647; (2) "repeated filings of groundless and improvident charges for the
purpose to harass," Redd, 2001 UT 113, at *f 20; and (3) "intentionally holding back crucial
evidence to impair a defendant's pretrial discovery rights and to ambush [him or] her at trial
with the withheld evidence," Morgan, 2001 UT 87, at \ 14.
None of these practices are implicated by reopening the State's case after the
prosecution has rested or by continuing the hearing. First, there is no danger of forum
shopping because the same magistrate presides over the reopened case and the continued
hearing. Second, there is no danger of harassment by multiple criminal filings because there
are none—defendant is charged with the offense only once. See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, at \
25 (finding no harassment where prosecutor "attempted to reopen the preliminary hearing
immediately upon recognizing the magistrate was not satisfied with the level of evidence
12

required to bind over defendant"). Harassment through repeated continuances is also of no
concern because the continuance of a proceeding is discretionary with the court. See State v.
Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991) (holding that "[t]he grant or denial of a
continuance is within the discretion of the trial court"), cert denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah
1992); see also State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, f 35, 65 P.3d 648 (holding that "[a] trial
court has discretionary authority to determine whether to reopen a case to admit additional
evidence"), cert, granted on other grounds, 76 P.3d 691 (Utah 2003). And likewise, there is
no danger of a prosecutor intentionally withholding crucial evidence because he or she runs
the risk that the magistrate will deny any motion to reopen or continue. In short, none of the
concerns identified in Brickey and its progeny are present with reopening or continuing.
Defendant claims that the Brickey rule should be extended to continuances because
the function of the Brickey rule is to "ensure[ ] that groundless or improvident prosecutions
do not proceed, protect[ ] the defendant from the degradation and expense of having to
defend at more than one preliminary hearing, [and] conserve[ ] judicial resources by not
allowing the state to repeatedly waste court time by refiling cases and conducting multiple
hearings . .. ." Aplt. Brf. at 18. That is not what the Court in Brickey held. Rather, the
Court explained:
The preliminary hearing [ ] acts as a screening device to 'ferret out
. . . groundless and improvident prosecutions'
This function [of the
preliminary hearing] is important because it not only relieves the accused of
the 'substantial degradation and expense' attendant to a criminal trial, but
also because it helps conserve judicial resources and promotes confidence in
the judicial system.
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Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646 (quotingState v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (1980)). In other
words, ferreting out "groundless and improvident prosecutions" is the function of the
preliminary hearing, not the Brickey rule. Relieving the accused of the "substantial
degradation and expense of a criminal trial" is the purpose of'the preliminary hearing, not
the Brickey rule. Conserving judicial resources is likewise the purpose of'thepreliminary
hearing, not the Brickey rule.
Defendant has taken language referring to the purposes of the preliminary hearing and
rephrased it to refer to the purposes of the Brickey rule. The Supreme Court never suggested
that these purposes are equivalent with the purposes of the Brickey rule. To the contrary,
Brickey is only concerned with the refiling of criminal charges to the extent that refiling is
done with an intent to harass, forum shop, impair a defendant's discovery rights, or ambush a
defendant at trial. Otherwise, "Brickey does n o t . . . indicate any intent to forbid refiling
generally or preclude refiling where a defendant's due process rights are not implicated."
Morgan, 2001 UT 87, at Tf 15.
As held by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals—the source of Utah's Brickey rule—the
due process limits on refiling charges earlier dismissed does not "provide for any lessening
of the examining magistrate's discretion in the conduct of a preliminary examination."
Harper v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 484 P.2d 891, 897 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971)
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(emphasis added). As such, "granting the state a continuance at a preliminary examination is
within the discretion of the examining magistrate." Id.
3. Even if Brickey Applied to Reopenings and Continuances, the
Reopening and Continuance Here Did Not Violate Brickey.
Even assuming arguendo the Brickey rule did extend to reopenings and continuances,
the reopening of the prosecution's case and continuance of the preliminary hearing here
comported with state due process principles.
As noted, Brickey holds that a prosecutor may not refile criminal charges earlier
dismissed for insufficient evidence "unless the prosecutor can show that new or previously
unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refiling." 714 P.2d at
647. In Morgan, the Utah Supreme Court clarified that new and previously unavailable
evidence are but two examples of good cause. 2001 UT 87, at % 19. The Court explained
that "'[o]ther good cause' . . . simply means additional subcategories, other than 'new
evidence' or 'previously unavailable evidence,' that justify refiling. Id. The Court then held
that good cause includes an innocent miscalculation of the evidence required for bindover.
Id. The Court explained that "the miscalculation must be innocent, and [that] further

Harper concluded that "in the event the prosecutor miscalculates and fails to present
sufficient evidence to show probable cause to bind over the accused, but possesses other
witnesses whose testimony would strengthen his showing, it is clearly within the discretion
of the examining magistrate to grant the state a continuance for that purpose." Harper, 484
P.2d at 897. The court further stated that in such circumstances "it is presumed that the
additional witnesses, or other evidence, are reasonably available; and that a continuance will
not be sought in order to conduct further investigation seeking that evidence, in a dilatory
manner." Id.
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investigation must be nondilatory and not otherwise infringe on due process rights of
defendant." Id. (emphasis in original).
Defendant charges that the prosecutor was dilatory in her preparation, contending that
she was not prepared to elicit testimony "establish[ing] what specific property was missing
or recovered and its value." Aplt. Brf. at 22. Specifically, defendant alleges that the
prosecutor failed to make available to the witnesses a list that would have provided the
necessary evidence. Aplt. Brf. at 22. She argues that the victim could only "speculate" as to
what was stolen, what was recovered, and the value. Aplt. Brf. at 22-24, 28, 34-40.
According to defendant, the prosecutor's decision to go forward without more specific
evidence cannot constitute an innocent miscalculation. Aplt. Brf. at 19-22.
Contrary to defendant's claim, the victim was not "engaged in a type of guessing
game as to what exactly was missing and its probable worth." Aplt. Brf. at 35. Before the
prosecutor initially rested, Hildebrand clearly and unequivocally testified that the thieves
stole twelve autographed baseballs, a box containing some 300 baseball cards from
underneath his bed, and ten binders of baseball cards from his book shelf in the front room.
R. 222: 7-10. He estimated that his autographed baseballs were worth between $1,510 and
$1,850.3 He testified that among the 300 cards in the large box, he had 35 autographed

His most valuable baseball—autographed by living members of the 500 Home Run
Club—was worth "well over [$]500." R. 222: 8. Of the remaining eleven baseballs, three
were worth $50 each, those signed by Johnny Bench, Pete Rose, and Yogi Berra were worth
between $120 and $150 each, and the remaining five were worth between $100 and $150
each. R. 222:8,21-22.
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cards, ranging in value from $400 for each of his two Willie Mays cards, to $ 150 to $200 for
other players, to $100 or less for lesser players. R. 222: 10.4 He testified that the stolen
binders included six sets of "specialty" cards, worth up to $3,000, and "hundreds and
hundreds" of individual cards in each binder, worth "another $2,000." R. 222: 9. Through
defendant's testimony, therefore, the State established that some $10,000 in baseball
memorabilia was stolen.
Defendant criticizes the evidence of value because Hildebrand testified only in terms
of estimates or "probabl[e] worth." Aplt. Brf. at 34-40. However, the State was not required
to prove the value of the stolen goods with mathematical certainty. At a preliminary hearing,
the prosecution need only "present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable beliefth^t an
offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." State v. Clark, 2001UT 9,
f 16, 20 P.3d 300 (emphasis added). Moreover, '"the magistrate must view all evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution.'" Id. at f 10 (quoting State v. Hester, 2000 UT
App 159, <f| 7, 3 P.3d 725). An estimate of value by the owner of stolen property meets the
probable cause burden. See State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1985) (holding that
"[b]ecause an owner is presumed to be familiar with the value of his possessions, an owner is
competent to testify on the present value of his property").

4

The magistrate found that the total value of the 35 autographed balls was between
$5,330 and $6,400. R. 176:^6. This finding fits within the price range given by Hildebrand
and has not been challenged by defendant on appeal.
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Hildebrand also testified that after defendant and Boone were apprehended, he
recovered all the autographed baseballs. R. 222: 14, 20-22, 36. He further testified that he
recovered "a lot of the cards that had been in the box" and "many of the binders" of baseball
cards, though some pages were missing. R. 222: 14-15,24,36. Although most of the more
valuable cards in the box were not recovered, he testified that he did recover the two Willie
Mays cards (valued at $400 each). R. 222: 24. Allen also testified that some of the cards
presented to him at the card shop were "expensive individual cards that were graded." R.
222: 30. Hildebrand did not more specifically identify the cards that were recovered or give
a separate estimate of their value. However, he had already estimated the total value of
stolen cards to be as much as $8,300, apart from the Willie Mays cards. Where he had
recovered a "lot of the cards" in the box and "many" of the binders, including the expensive
cards presented to Allen, the magistrate could reasonably infer that another $2,700 in cards
had been recovered, equating to less than one-third of the value of all the stolen cards. The
evidence was thus sufficient for bindover on a second degree felony before the continuance,
as the magistrate ultimately ruled. See R. 180: If 21.
Even if it was not, nothing in the record suggests that the prosecutor's failure to
produce sufficient evidence regarding value was anything more than an innocent
miscalculation. Where Hildebrand identified the property taken from his apartment and its
estimated value, the prosecutor reasonably assumed that he also would be able to provide
estimates of the value of the recovered property—with or without exhibits or lists.
Moreover, the record reveals that the prosecutor "had a problem with subpoenas," and as a
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result, Detective Johnson did not have time to get the evidence. R. 222: 52,54. Given these
circumstances, any lack of evidence to establish a second degree felony can only be regarded
as an innocent miscalculation. Certainly, the prosecutor cannot be said to have been
"seeking an unfair advantage over [ ] defendant [ b y ] . . . withholding evidence." Redd, 2001
UT 113, at 113.
Citing Holmes v. District Court of Summit County, 668 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1983),
defendant accuses the prosecutor here of'"the undesirable practice of presenting as little
evidence as possible at the preliminary hearing.'" Aplt. Brf. at 45 (quotingHolmes, 668 P.2d
at 15). In Holmes, however, the prosecutor made a tactical decision not to call the informant
who participated in a controlled buy, relying instead on the hearsay testimony of the
investigating officer. Holmes, 668 P.2d at 13. In contrast, the prosecutor here called the
victim of the theft, who was in the best position to testify regarding the recovered cards.
There was no attempt to conceal that testimony. Holmes therefore does not apply.
Nor is this case like Redd, where the prosecutor "failed to provide a scintilla of
evidence" on an essential element of the offense. Redd, 2001 UT 113, at 117. In Redd, the
Utah Supreme Court concluded that "[a] presumptively abusive practice [also] occurs when a
prosecutor refiles a charge after providing no evidence for an essential and clear element of a
crime at a preliminary hearing." Id. at \ 20 (emphasis added). As discussed above, the
evidence established that in addition to the twelve baseballs, valued at up to $1,850, and the
two Willie Mays cards, valued at $800, Hildebrand recovered a "lot of the cards" in the box
and "many" of the binders. R. 222: 14-15,24, 36. Although the exact value of these cards

19

was not established, the magistrate could reasonably infer that they represented a significant
portion of the remainder of the baseball card collection, valued at some $8,300. See, supra,
at 18.
In sum, the prosecutor's failure to produce more specific evidence of value was at
worst an innocent miscalculation of the evidence. Therefore, even if Brickey applied here,
the magistrate did not violate due process in allowing the State to reopen its case after resting
and in continuing the preliminary hearing for additional evidence.
B.

NEITHER THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE NOR THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE BAR A CONTINUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY HEARING OR THE
REOPENING OF THE STATE'S CASE AFTER THE PROSECUTION HAS
RESTED.

Defendant also cites rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence as support for his claim
that a preliminary hearing may not be continued. Aplt. Brf. at 42-43, 50. Defendant's
reliance on that rule is misplaced.
Paragraph (a) of rule 1102 provides that "[rjeliable hearsay is admissible at criminal
preliminary examinations." Utah R. Evid. 1102(a). Paragraph (b) lists nine types of hearsay
evidence that is deemed reliable "[f]or purposes of criminal preliminary examinations only."
Utah R. Evid. 1102(b). Paragraph (c) of the rule provides:
(c) Continuance for Production of Additional Evidence. If hearsay
evidence is proffered or admitted in the preliminary examination, a
continuance of the hearing may be granted for the purpose of furnishing
additional evidence if:
(1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted is
not sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for a bindover; or
(2) The defense establishes that it would be so substantially and unfairly
disadvantaged by the use of the hearsay evidence as to outweigh the interests
of the declarant and the efficient administration of justice.
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Utah R. Evid. 1102(c). In other words, "[paragraph (c) provides for continuances in the
preliminary examination to enable a party to provide live witnesses or a more reliable form
of hearsay where a party is substantially disadvantaged by the admission or exclusion of
hearsay evidence proffered under this rule." Utah R. Evid. 1102, Advisory Committee Note.
As the foregoing examination of the rule demonstrates, rule 1102 does no more than
govern the admission of hearsay at a preliminary hearing. It does not purport to limit the
magistrate's discretion in granting continuances generally, as argued by defendant.
Defendant also contends that rule 7(i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
prohibits the State from reopening its case after it has rested or from obtaining a continuance
after having introduced some evidence. Aplt. Brf. at 41,48-50. Rule 7(i) contains no such
prohibition.
Rule 7(i) provides in relevant part as follows:
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed
it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be bound over to
answer in the district court. . . .
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate
shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense.
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i). The rule presupposes the termination of the hearing and the inclusion
of all the State's evidence. It in no way suggests that the magistrate may not permit the State
to reopen its case after resting but before a final order of dismissal.
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Moreover, rule 7 provides that "a preliminary examination shall be held under rules
and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court." Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(l). The
Utah Supreme Court has held that a court "has broad latitude to control and manage the
proceedings and preserve the integrity of the trial process." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,
1282 (Utah 1989).
Consistent with a court's broad latitude in managing the proceedings, Utah appellate
courts have long recognized that a trial court may grant a prosecutor's request to reopen its
case at trial to meet an insufficiency challenge. State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, f 35, 65
P.3d 648, cert, granted on other grounds, 16 P.3d 691 (Utah 2003). For example, in State v.
Gregorious, 81 Utah 33, 16 P.2d 893 (1932), the defendant was charged with having
committed an infamous crime against nature. The State rested its case after calling as its
only witness an accomplice to the crime. Id. at 894-95. Citing the rule that a conviction
could not be sustained based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, the
defendant moved for a directed verdict for insufficient evidence. Id. at 895. Rather than
granting defendant's motion, the trial court granted the State's request to reopen the case so
that it could call a witness who could provide the corroborating testimony. Id. The Utah
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that "[i]t was within the discretion of the
court to permit the case to be reopened." Id.
InState v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323,234 P.2d 600 (1951), the State charged defendant
with grand larceny, but failed to put on any evidence of the value of the stolen car. Id. at
325-26, 234 P.2d at 601. Rather than moving to reopen the case, the State asked the trial
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court to take judicial notice that the car's value exceeded the grand larceny requirements. Id.
at 326, 234 P.2d at 601. The court denied the motion for a directed verdict and instructed the
jury that it must "'take the value of this property as being in excess of $50.00 and therefore
the defendant, if he is guilty at all, is guilty of grand larceny.'" Id. In holding that the judge
erred in so instructing the jury, the Supreme Court noted that the prosecutor "might properly
and with little difficulty have moved to reopen and supply the missing evidence." Id.
Just as a trial court has the discretion to permit the State to reopen its case in response
to an insufficiency challenge after the prosecution has rested, a magistrate has the authority
to permit the State to reopen its case or to continue a preliminary hearing.
Relying on State v. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533 (Utah App. 1989) {opinion withdrawn
from publication May 8, 1990), defendant contends that a motion to reopen a preliminary
hearing is not recognized in Utah. Aplt. Brf. at 15 fii.2, 42.5 Defendant fails to mention,
however, that the State's motion to reopen the preliminary hearing in Johnson came after the
magistrate dismissed the charges following a preliminary hearing, and was treated as a
motion for a new trial, which indeed it was. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533, *l-2. Therefore, the
motion to reopen in Johnson was not a motion similar in kind to that made by the prosecutor
in this case, which came during the preliminary hearing. The State's motion to reopen in

5

The decision in Johnson was withdrawn from publication after a rehearing was
granted. See Johnson, 782 P.2d 533. Although the decision no longer appears in the bound
volume of the Pacific Reporter, the State uses the Pacific Reporter citation because it can be
located in Westlaw with that citation. Pin cites, however, are not available, and the State
thus uses the screen number, e.g., Johnson, 782 P.2d 533, at *3.
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Johnson "serve[d] no purpose other than to request the trial court to reconsider its order of
dismissal"

Id. As mentioned, no order of dismissal was issued in this case. Johnson,

therefore, does not support defendant's claim.
* * *

In summary, the preliminary hearing is not a game, where every misstep by the
prosecutor inures to the benefit of the defendant.

The Brickey rule itself focuses on

balancing both a prosecutor's right to freely prosecute and a defendant's due process rights.
Morgan, 2001 UT 87, at % 11. And as aptly observed by the Supreme Court of North Dakota
long ago, "[rjules of criminal procedure were not formulated to enable criminals to escape
punishment," but rather, "to aid the courts in properly dispensing justice in criminal cases."
State v. Webb, 162 N.W. 358, 362 (N.D. 1917). Continuing, the North Dakota court
observed that such rules "are intended, on the one hand, to safeguard the rights of the
accused to the end that no innocent person may be convicted of crime, and they are intended,
on the other hand, to enable the state to bring those guilty of crime to the bar ofjustice." Id.
Where a prosecutor fails to put on sufficient evidence to bind over a defendant, neither due
process nor the rules of procedure bar the court from reopening the case or continuing the
hearing to provide the necessary evidence.
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II.

THE EVIDENCE AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS
SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE THAT
DEFENDANT POSSESSED THE BASEBALL MEMORABILIA FOUND
IN HIS FRIEND'S CAR AND APARTMENT
Defendant further argues that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate his

constructive possession of the baseball memorabilia inside his friend's car and apartment.
Aplt. Brf. at 30-34. This claim fails.
To demonstrate constructive possession, the State must establish "that there was a
sufficient nexus between the accused and the [property] to permit an inference that the
accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the
[property]." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme Court has
explained that the determination of constructive possession "turns on the particular
circumstances of the case." Id. Factors that may be considered in linking an accused with
property include incriminating statements, suspicious or incriminating behavior, sale of [the
property], use of [the property], proximity of defendant to location of [the property],
[property] in plain view, and [property] on defendant's person." State v. Salas, 820 P.2d
1386,1388 (Utah App. 1991). These factors, however, "are not universally pertinent factors,
and they are not legal elements of constructive possession in any context." State v. Layman,
985 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1999).
For purposes of bindover, the evidence was sufficient to establish a reasonable belief
that defendant had both the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the
stolen baseball memorabilia.
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Defendant made incriminating statements, admitting that he possessed Hildebrand's
stolen baseball cards. When interviewed about the stolen cards, he claimed that he had
"found some baseball cards and other items" near a dumpster while at work. R. 222: 35,3739. He explained that he decided to sell the cards because he believed they were worth some
money. R. 222: 35, 37-39. Boone also made statements incriminating defendant. Boone
told Detective Johnson that defendant had asked him for a ride so defendant could sell some
cards. R. 222: 43. Defendant sold some of Hildebrand's stolen baseball cards. The
evidence established that two men walked into Allen's baseball card shop wanting to sell
Hildebrand's stolen baseball cards. R. 222:28-29. Defendant was subsequently found with
a check from a card shop payable to defendant at the check cashing store to which Allen
referred the two men. See R. 222: 13, 33-35, 37, 39, 42. A stolen baseball and card were
found in the area where defendant presumably sat while traveling to sell the baseball cards.
Defendant admitted that he rode in Boone's car and the most expensive baseball and a
baseball card were found on the front passenger floorboard of Boone's car. R. 222: 36.
Although the foregoing evidence might not be sufficient to prove constructive
possession at trial, it is more than sufficient under the "relatively low" evidentiary standard
required at a preliminary hearing. Clark, 2001 UT 9, at ^f 10. Under this standard, the facts
need only support a reasonable inference of possession. Id. at ^ 11, 20. This is so even if
the facts also support a contrary inference. Id. at \ 20. Indeed, this Court "'assum[es] [ ] that
the prosecution's case will only get stronger as the investigation continues.'" Id. (quoting
Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1998)).

26

Based on Boone's admission that he was responding to defendant's request for a ride
to sell the baseball cards and defendant's admission that he possessed baseball cards which
were stolen from Hildebrand, the magistrate could reasonably infer that defendant first took
the cards to Boone's apartment and from there went to the card shop. The magistrate could
also reasonably infer that Boone minimized his own role in the theft and that both men
possessed the cards. Either way, the reasonable inference is that defendant had both the
power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the cards in both the trunk and the
apartment. The only other inference is that defendant found some of the stolen cards at work
and that Boone obtained possession of the other cards independently. That inference is the
least likely of all the inferences.
In sum, the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that defendant
possessed all of the stolen cards that were recovered by police. This Court should therefore
affirm the magistrate's bindover order.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions.
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Addendum A

Addendum A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,

(Motion to Quash Bindover)

vs.

Case No. 021101432 FS

DANIEL ROGERS,

Judge PAT B.BRIAN

Defendant.
f1

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on April 29, 2003 for hearing on Daniel

Rogers (Defendant) Motion to Quash Bindover. The Court has reviewed Defendant's motion
and supplemental memorandum and the State's opposition to Defendant's motion. Having
considered those memoranda along with oral arguments, the applicable constitutional provisions,
statutes and case law, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to quash.
BACKGROUND
Tf2

On August 20,2002, the Defendant was charged by information for theft by receiving

stolen property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Aim. § 76-6-408 and theft by
deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405.
^[3

A preliminary hearing was scheduled for November 7, 2002. On November 4, 2002, the

State requested a continuance. That same day, the Court granted the State's motion to continue
and the preliminary hearing was rescheduled for November 26, 2002.
\A

On November 26, 2002, Defendant failed to appear. The Court issued a bench warrant

for Defendant and rescheduled the preliminary hearing for December 17, 2002.
^5

On December 17, 2002, the preliminary hearing was held before the court, Roth, J.

000175

Tf6

The following facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, were established at

the December 17, 2002, preliminary hearing. On July 23, 2002, sometime between one p.m. to
eight p.m., Robert Paul Hildebrand's, (Hildebrand) apartment was broken into and many items
stolen. Specifically, an unopened six disc, DVD player worth $750, a minolta 35 mm camera
worth $200, a pioneer stereo with a six disc player, originally worth $900 present value $400500, twelve (12) autographed baseballs total value between $1450-1850, ten (10) binders of
baseball cards total value about $5000, autographed cards total value between $5330-6400, a set
of black pearl earrings originally cost $1250 with a present value of $1500, and Olympic pins
worth $200. Hildebrand contacted the police department.
Y7

The following day, on July 24, 2002, Hildebrand contacted several, local baseball card

shops to tell them to watch for the stolen items. Hildebrand contacted baseball card shop owner,
Elvin Allen (Allen), about the stolen baseballs and cards. Within an hour, two men entered
Allen's store with items that Allen believed were Hildebrand's stolen items. Allen purchased
some of the items from the men using a check. Allen immediately contacted Hildebrand and
informed Hildebrand that he had Hildenbrand's stolen items.
TJ8

Allen cancelled the check. Later that day, Allen received a call from a check cashing

place, as shown on his caller ID. Allen contacted Hildebrand and told him that the people were
attempting to cash the check at a check cashing place and gave Hildebrand the phone number
displayed on his caller ID.
^[9

Hildebrand contacted the police and gave them the phone number to trace the address of

the check cashing location. The police arrived and observed a signed, encased baseball in the
front seat and a baseball card on the floor of the front, passenger seat of the vehicle that the
-2-

Defendant and his companion, Joshua Boone (Boone) arrived in. The vehicle that Defendant and
Boone arrived in was owned by Boone's girlfriend. The police detained Defendant and Boone.
In the trunk of the vehicle, were many baseball cards. Defendant informed the police that he
found the baseball cards in a dumpster. Thereafter, police discovered at Boone's apartment,
multiple baseballs, binders, baseball cards, DVD/CD player, and Olympic pins,
f 10

At the December 17, 2002 hearing, after the State rested, Defendant argued that there was

insufficient evidence to bindover. Specifically, Defendant argued that the value of the items was
not sufficiently established to bindover for the second degree felony charge because the only
evidence associated with Defendant was one baseball and one card. Even viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the State, this did not amount to $5000, which is an element of the
charge for theft by receiving stolen property. Defendant argued, therefore, that the bindover
should be denied on that count.
f 11

The State moved to reopen because the Prosecutor was "given some more information"

and needed to take some further testimony. Defendant objected, arguing that the State rested its
case. The Court granted the motion to reopen.
^[12

The State recalled the police officer to the stand and asked him questions about the black

pearl earrings. The officer indicated that the earrings were pawned. Although the officer did not
have the pawn receipt with him, he recalled that it was in evidence at the sheriffs office.
^[13

The Court sua sponte continued the hearing on the limited issue of value of the items

found that were attributable to Defendant, which the Court stated was the baseballs and baseball

-3-
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cards found in the car and the home.1 Defendant objected arguing that a continuance was in
opposition to the purpose of a preliminary hearing because after the State rests its case and
Defense counsel reveals all of the State's weaknesses, the court can just grant a continuance,
allow the State to gather more evidence for the next hearing, so that there would be sufficient
evidence to bindover the Defendant.
f 14

On January 7, 2003 a hearing was held on the limited issue of the value of the items

found attributable to the Defendant in the car and at the home.
^[15

The Court, Roth, J., bound over for trial the first charge for theft by receiving

stolen property, a second degree felony, in violation of § 76-6-408 and dismissed the second
charge for theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of § 76-6-405
LAW
HI6

At a preliminary hearing "the prosecution must present evidence sufficient for the

magistrate to find probable cause to believe that the crime charged had been committed and that
the defendant has committed i t . . . . The evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
prosecution with all inferences resolved in the prosecution's favor... . The defendant should be
bound over for trial unless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference
to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim." State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26,
flO, 44 P.3d 730 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.). Recently, the Utah
Supreme Court clarified that the "quantum of evidence necessary to support a bindover is less

1

The Court also continued the hearing on the issue of the earrings and the pawn ticket.
Defendant objected and the State stipulated that the earrings and pawn ticket would not be an
issue at the next hearing.
-4f\f\f\^B

than that necessary to survive a directed verdict motion." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,1fl6, 20
P.3d 300. While the prosecution must produce "believable evidence of all the elements of the
crime charged" in order to sustain its burden at the preliminary hearing stage, "unlike a motion
for a directed verdict, this evidence need not be capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." /rf. atfl5.
Tf 17

Section 76-6-408 provides that theft by receiving stolen property occurs when:
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the
property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing
that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds
or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property from the
owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the
owner of it.

Tfl8

Theft of property is a second degree felony if the value of the property or services is or

exceeds $5000. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(a)(i). If the value of the property stolen is less
than $300 then the theft charge is a class B misdemeanor. § 76-6-412(l)(d).
ANALYSIS
Tfl9

Defendant claims that the Court improperly granted the State's motion to reopen.

Specifically, Defendant argues that a motion to 'reopen5 a preliminary hearing is not a motion
recognized in the Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure citing State v. Johnson, 1989 Utah App,
LEXIS 172, *3 (October 30, I989)(unpublished opinion).
^[20

In opposition, the State argues that there was sufficient evidence to establish the second

degree felony charge before the Court granted the State's motion to reopen. The Court agrees
with the State.

-5-
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f21

The Court concludes that there was sufficient evidence presented before the motion to

reopen was granted because the evidence presented established that Defendant was in possession
or control of $5000 or more of stolen properly. The evidence showed that Defendant was in
possession or control of the property that was pawned to Allen because the check was written in
Defendant's name. Defendant was also in possession or control of the property that was in the
vehicle that Defendant and Boone arrived in at the check cashing place. The evidence reflected
that there was a signed, encased baseball in the front seat and a baseball card on the front, floor
of the passenger seat. In the trunk of the vehicle there were multiple baseball cards. Defense
counsel inquired of the Court, Roth, J., whether the evidence at the apartment would be
considered and the Court, Roth, J., affirmed that it would be. Defense counsel did not object.
Applying the evidence obtained in the apartment as well as the evidence obtained in the vehicle
and at the pawn shop, the Court concludes that there was sufficient evidence from Hildebrand's
testimony that the value of the stolen property recovered was $5000 or more.2

2

Nevertheless, the Court notes that although a motion to reopen is not a motion within
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court's, Roth, J., granting of the motion to reopen was
harmless error. The Court could have dismissed the charges under Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3).
However, the dismissal and discharge would not have precluded the State from refiling because
good cause to re-file exists "when a prosecutor innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence
required to obtain a bindover." State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, f 14, 34 P.3d 767 (Utah
200l)(citing State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 n.5 (Utah 1986). It is clear to this Court that
there were no abusive practices involved in the State's motion to reopen, but simply an innocent
miscalculation of the evidence necessary to bindover. Witnesses that were called at the first
hearing were recalled during that hearing and at the second hearing to provide more detail about
the value of the items. There does not appear to be any bad faith on the part of the prosecutor,
which is what could prevent the State from refiling. Since the result would have been the same
because the State could have refiled and anothei preliminary hearing could have been held before
the Court, Roth, J., this Court notes that even if the evidence was insufficient, the Court, Roth, /.,
committed harmless error that was not prejudicial to the Defendant. If anything, the Court, Roth,
J., prevented an inconvenience to the Defendant by reopening the State's case. State v. Morgan,
-6-

^[22

Accordingly, the Lomt IH Nil :> DCIUJCIJJJI =» niotn JI k

S ) ^ hrc 1 Ilns//b d i

line

iSi

003

Judge PAT B.BRIAN
Third District Court>dg,e ^ ' 4 > ^ «

^ a££
^

II I I

^

>

>

•

1 )

AAA^O^

